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GENOCIDE TREATY-ETHNIC CLEANSING-SUBSTANTIVE AND
PROCEDURAL HURDLES IN THE APPLICATION OF THE GENOCIDE
CONVENTION TO ALLEGED CRIMES IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On Tuesday, October 15, 1991, in a controversial vote, the parliament of
the Yugoslav republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina proclaimed their republic a
sovereign state and adopted documents to secede from Yugoslavia.' In so
doing, Bosnia-Herzegovina joined Croatia and Slovenia who declared
independence in June of 19912 Fearing political and economic domination
by the communist, Serbian controlled government of Yugoslavia,3 the nearly
two million Muslims and eight hundred thousand Croats within Bosnia-
Herzegovina voted in a landslide public election in favor of independence in
December of 199 .
'Timothy Heritage, Bosnia Moves Toward Independence in Fresh Blow to Yugoslavia,
Reuters, para. 2 (Oct. 15, 1991).
2 Slovenia and Croatia, resenting the economic drain of the less wealthy southern
republics pushed for democratic governments in their own region and a loose federation for
all the republics of Yugoslavia. Serbia, dissimilarly, wanted to retain the communist system
with a strong centralized government which could retain the resources of the other republics
while protecting the serb minorities within them. Charles L. Nier Ill, The Yugoslavian Civil
War: An Analysis of the applicability of the Laws of War Governing Non-International Armed
Conflicts in the Modern World, 10 DICK. J. INT'L L. 310.
As of January, 1993 as many as 10,000 people have died in the civil war in Croatia
resulting from Croatia's declaration of independence. Chronology of Yugoslav War, Press
Association Newsfile, para. 3 (Jan. 23, 1993).
3 The Yugoslavia of 1991 was a nation of 23 million inhabitants of diverse ethnic and
regional identity. Yugoslavia was composed of six semi-autonomous republics. The ethnic
groups within Yugoslavia were largely associated with their home republic (i.e. Serbs come
from Serbia, Croatians from Croatia, and Slovenes from Slovenia). However, there has been
a great deal of migration over the centuries. Consequently there are a large number of Serbs
within Bosnia and Croatia, and Croatians within Bosnia. No one ethnic group constitutes a
majority in what was Yugoslavia, but Serbs (9.3 million) were the largest of all the ethnic
groups. Furthermore, no one ethnic group constitutes a majority within the Republic of
Bosnia. See infra part II, HIsTORIcAL BACKGROUND OF THE YuGOsLAV PEOPLE.
4 The fear of political and economic domination by communist- ruled Serbia similarly led
the republics of Croatia and Slovenia to seek independence from Yugoslavia. Bosnia-
Herzegovina Decides to Seek Independence, United Press Int'l, para. 7 (Dec. 20, 1991).
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The ninety-nine percent majority in favor of independence5 did not,
however, truly express the unanimous sentiment of the republic's citizenry.
Total turnout was only sixty-three percent, as the Serbian population, which
comprises thirty-one percent of Bosnia's total population, boycotted the
vote." The Serbian population within Bosnia-Herzegovina overwhelmingly
favored remaining in the Yugoslavian federation dominated by Serbian
leadership." As a consequence, resentment between the ethnic populations
within Bosnia-Herzegbvina increased, prompting the formation of "sectarian
militias" of Serbs, Croats and Moslems intent on ethnic violence.8
When the European Community recognized Bosnian independence on
April 6, 1992, Bosnian Serbs declared independence from the new state9 and
the ethnic violence erupted into civil war.'0 From April of 1992 to January
s Bosnian officials reported 66.4 percent of eligible voters participated with 99.43 percent
of those in favor of independence in the vote taken to win recognition from the European
Community. Roy Gutman, Bosnian Independence Proclaimed, NEWSDAY, Mar. 4, 1992, at
15.; see also, Official Results of Bosnia-Herzegovina Referendum on Independence, British
Broadcasting Corp., para. 1 (Mar. 4, 1992) (revealing identical results).
6 Bosnian Independence, supra note 5, at 15; Official Results of Bosnia-Herzegovina
Referendum on Independence, supra note 4, para 6; Carol J. Williams, Regional Vote in
Yugoslavia Risks Conflict; Referendum: A Move to Independence for Bosnia-Herzegovina in
this Weekend's Already Deadly Election Could Draw the Republic Into the Civil War, L.A.
TIMES, Mar. 1, 1992, at Al.
7 Serbs overwhelmingly voted to keep Bosnia-Herzegovina within a Yugoslav federation
in a November referendum. Bosnia-Herzegovina Decides to Seek Independence, United Press
Int'l, para. 11 (Dec. 20, 199 1).
a In the months before Bosnia's vote for independence, outbreaks of ethnic violence
increased as did a flood of illegal arms into the region. Sectarian militias were formed as the
Serb-dominated federal army added to its troops there. The Serb militias are supported by
the Federal Yugoslav Army which "purged" its top ranks of non-Serbs shortly before the
referendum on Bosnian independence. Id. para 17.
Aside from its ethnic composition, the army is fervently opposed to secession because the
majority of its lucrative military industry is located in Bosnia, Regional Vote in Yugoslavia,
supra note 6, para. 16.
9 From their stronghold in the region of Banja Luka, northeast of Sarajevo, Bosnian Serbs
declared independence and the formation of a "Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina."
Victoria Stegic, Independence Brings Civil War for Bosnia, Agence France Presse, para. 3
(Apr. 7, 1992).
'0 European Community foreign ministers granted recognition to Bosnia-Herzegovina on
Monday, April 6, 1992. EC Recognizes Independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Xinhua Gen.
News Service, Apr. 6, 1992.
Serbs living in Bosnia were confronted with the prospect of becoming a minority in the
new nation of Bosnia-Herzegovina rather than members of the largest ethnic block in the
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of 1993, the number of persons killed in Bosnia-Herzegovina is estimated at
more than 17,000, though the actual number of persons killed is likely much
higher." The true horror of the conflict, however, may be the plight of
over two million refugees who flee not only the fighting but the practice of
what has become known as "ethnic cleansing",1
The practice of "ethnic cleansing," also referred to as "ethnic purification,"
involves the elimination of rival ethnic groups of political opposition. 3
The practice may also constitute genocide 4 which requires condemnation
by the international community under the Genocide Convention. 5 In the
nation of Yugoslavia. This was a proposition that led many Serbs to declare independence
from the new nation in a show of allegiance to the old. Independence Brings Civil War,
supra note 9, para. 8.
Fighting raged throughout Bosnia when the EC recognized Bosnian independence as
Bosnian Serbs proclaimed their own "Serbian Republic of Bosnia Herzegovina" in defiance
of the newly recognized state of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Id. at paras. 3,4.
" More than 17,000 have died in Bosnian fighting with over two million refugees fleeing
from fighting and "ethnic cleansing." Chronology of Yugoslav War, supra, note 2, para 3.
Sen. Larry Pressler (R) of South Dakota, the ranking member of the Senate Foreign
Relations Subcommittee on European Affairs, estimates 40,000 people dead or missing and
two million driven from their homes. Larry Pressler, Justice Must Be Demanded for 'Ethnic
Cleansing' Crimes, THE CHRISTIAN Sci. MONITOR, Dec. 29, 1992, 19. Rep. Fred McCloskey
(D) of Indiana, a member of the House Armed Services and Foreign Affairs Committees,
estimates that Serb forces in Bosnia have killed between 128,000 and 200,000 Bosnians or
one out of ten Muslims in Bosnia. Fred McCloskey, The U.S. is Appeasing Fascism and
Genocide, THE CHRISTIAN SC. MONITOR, Dec. 31, 1992, 19.
12 One aspect of "ethnic cleansing" which has "shocked the world" is the forced removal
of Croats and Muslims from their homes by Serbian forces. H.D.S. Greenway, Balkan Divide
Is Again Europe's Flashpoint; In a Post-Soviet 'Void,' Yugoslavia is Again Splintered Into
Its Tribes, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 4, 1992, at 18.
13 Trade Subcomm. Of The House Ways and Means Comm.: Hearing on HR 5258,
Withdraw Most Favored Nation (MFN) Status From Yugoslavia (1992), (Statement of
Representative Wolf) [hereinafter Statement of Representative Wolf]. Ethnic purification on
the part of Serbia involves the slaughter of every ethnic group except their own and conjures
up memories of Nazis activities during World War II.
"4 Id. (statement of Holly Burkhalter, Washington Director Human Rights Watch)
[hereinafter statement of Holly Burkhalter]. "Ethnic cleansing" is genocide. The Serb practice
includes the deliberate slaughter of civilians for no other reason than that they are Croat or
Muslim, the deliberate practice of creating refugees, and the creation of ghettos for the
purpose of starvation.
is Id. See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide, 78 U.N.T.S. 277
[hereinafter Genocide Convention], Article I declares that "genocide ... is a crime under
international law which [contracting parties] undertake to prevent and to punish."
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past year there has been a steady outcry from political leaders, journalists,
and human rights activists for the application of the Genocide Convention
to the alleged crimes occurring in Bosnia-Herzegovina.' 6  But as of yet,
despite the numerous reports of "ethnic cleansing," including civilian
killings, mutilation, torture, starvation, operation of detention centers,
executions, mass graves, systematic rape, and mass terrorization of Croats
and Muslims, 7 no authoritative action has been taken beyond the creation
of a United Nations Commission to study the action.'
16 "The Genocide Convention indeed demands that the international community put a stop
to genocide. ... it's well past time for the international community to make good on their
promises under the Convention." Statement of Holly Burkhalter, supra note 14.
"Lining up Muslim males in town after town, killing them randomly, burning villages,
raping women, dotting the land with 'detention centers' that practice torture and execution -
all say to Muslims: leave. ... Both Slobodan Milosevic [Serbian president] and Bosnian
Serb leader Radovan Karadzic must be investigated." Bosnia: Do Something, CHRISTIAN Scd.
MONITOR, Aug. 12, 1992, at 20.
Prima facie evidence of genocide reveals violations of the Genocide Convention prompting
the call for the formation of an international criminal court to prosecute such violations.
Leonard Doyle, Call For Serbs To Face War Crimes Trial, THE INDEPENDENT, Aug. 13,
1992, at 7.
German Foreign minister Klaus Kinkel accused Serbia of attempting to carry out "ethnic
cleansing" which would be a crime under the Genocide Convention which is binding on
Serbia and other successor states. Richard Murphy, Bonn Wants Human Rights Court To Try
Serbs, The Reuter Lib. Rep., paras. 2,3 (Aug. 19, 1992).
17 The United Nations Commission on Human Rights adopted a resolution on December
1, 1992, condemning acts of "ethnic cleansing" including the killings, torture, and systematic
practice of rape. U.N. Condemns Violation of Human Rights in Ex- Yugoslavia, Xinhua News
Agency, Dec. 1, 1992.
It is alleged that Serbs have concocted detention and concentration camps to torture and
murder non-Serbs. Statement of Rep. Wolf, supra note 13.
The U.S. assistant secretary of state is quoted as saying "people are systematically abused,
tortured and executed" in Bosnia -Herzegovina. Bosnian Vice President Ejup Ganic cites
mass graves, mutilated corpses, people beaten to death, and women repeatedly raped and then
murdered. War Crimes Tribunal Gains Ground, Agence France Presse, paras. 6,8 (Aug. 13,
1992).
'S The U.N. Security Council authorized the creation of a special commission to examine
evidence of atrocities in former Yugoslavia on October 6, 1992. U.N. Creates Panel to
Examine Atrocities in Yugoslavia, THE GAZETTE (Montreal), Oct. 7, 1992, at B5.
The Commission was set up to examine evidence of "appalling crimes" committed by all
sides of the conflict, including execution of prisoners and the murder, rape, and torture of
civilians. Alan Ferguson, U.N. Set to Probe Yugoslav 'crimes', TORONTO STAR, Oct. 7, 1992,
at Al.
19931 GENOCIDE TREATY
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE YUGOSLAV PEOPLE
To understand the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, it is helpful to first
have some knowledge of the history of the Yugoslavian people and the
ensuing ethnic tensions.' 9 The term "Yugoslav" translates into South Slav,
the name given to the people who migrated to the Baltic region from the
north in the fourth century A.D. 2° The common origin of these people has
not, however, prevented the escalation of ethnic tension among them into
warfare and claims of genocide in the 1990's.
Southeast Europe, and the Balkans in particular, represent a cultural and
geographical crossroads where the same routes taken by the South Slav tribes
of the fourth century were followed by other invaders in the centuries to
come, each leaving an indelible mark on the people of that region. Within
the different areas, the people speak different languages, practice different
religions, and write with different alphabets.2' The term "Yugoslav" itself
did not come into existence until the eighteenth century,22 and before the
creation of Yugoslavia in 1918, the South Slav people had never been united
in a single state.'
19 FRED SINGLETON, A SHORT HISTORY OF THE YUGOSLAV PEOPLES ix (1985) (noting
that historical experiences are deeply embedded in the consciousness of the Yugoslav people).
2 Id. at 13-14.
21 The country is a contrasting combination of geographies, histories, cultures, religions,
languages and economies. JAMES Gow, LEGITIMACY AND THE MILITARY: THE YUGOSLAV
CRISIS 2 (1992).
By 1918, the South Slavs had come to think of themselves as Slovenes, Croats, Serbs, and
Montenegrins with ethnic muslims adding to the heterogeneity. SABRINA P. RAMET,
NATIONALISM AND FEDERALISM IN YUGOSLAVIA, 1962-1991 intro (1992); see also
SINGLETON, supra note 19 at 115 (noting that historical experiences are deeply imbedded in
the consciousness of the Yugoslav people); but see ALEKSA DJImAS, THE CONTESTED
COUNTRY 181 (1991) (recognizing that Yugoslavia could be defined as a mono-ethnic state
with closely related languages but with different political consciousness).
' SINGLETON, supra note 19, at 115. The term became popular during a period of
national awakening among the slavs in the region. Id. at 14.
23 Singleton points out that even when the South Slavs were independent of foreign rule,
they never united as a people beyond their immediate region:
The South Slav nationalists of the nineteenth century could... boast
of medieval greatness under Slav rulers. For them, however, there was no
single champion who had forged a South Slav empire which flourished
before the arrival of the alien invaders .... Each national group had its
own glorious epoch which it did not share with its neighbors; in fact, the
glories of one medieval kingdom were often achieved at the expense of
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The Slavic marauders who entered the Balkans in the fourth century A.D.
followed the lead of their Roman predecessors who expanded into the area
in the third century B.C. By the end of the sixth century A.D., the Slavs had
gradually settled into the region.' During the eighth century, the areas
now known as Slovenia and Croatia fell under the control of the Holy
Roman Empire as these Slavs became indoctrinated into the culture and
religion of the West.' A century later, Christianity came to the eastern
regions of Serbia and Macedonia from the Byzantine emperors. Thus, the
religious and cultural split between the Eastern Orthodox and Western
Roman Catholic Christian Empires found its geographical boundary in the
Balkans.26 The central area of Bosnia-Herzegovina, though it had no clear
national identity of its own until the late twelfth century, marked the dividing
line.27
In the fourteenth century, the Ottoman Turks invaded the region from the
south bringing a new cultural and religious influence in the form of Islam.
An early census of the fifteenth century noticed the quick conversion of a
large percentage of Bosnians resulting in the formation of "a native-born,
Slav speaking Muslim aristocracy."28 The Ottoman Turks eventually gained
control over Serbia, Macedonia, and Albania. The Serbs, however,
maintained their Orthodox Christianity. When the Serbian lead Slavic
nationalism movement met with harsh retaliation from the Turks in the
its neighbors. The cynical definition of a nation as a group of people
united by a common error as to their origins and a common dislike of
their neighbors' has a tragic relevance in the history of the Yugoslav
peoples.
Id. at 23.
2 Id. at 14.
2 Id. at 15.
26 In addition, the Eastern Slavs developed a separate alphabet from the Greek Cyrillic
script which in turn influenced the Slavonic language of that region. Id at 16-17.
"In 1054, when the great schism split Christendom between the Roman Catholic Church
and the Orthodox East, the fault line lay along the Drina, the river that now marks the
Serbian-Bosnian Border." H.D.S. Greenway, Balkan divide is again Europe's flashpoint; In
a post-Soviet 'void,' Yugoslavia is again splintered into its tribes, THE BOSTON GLOBE,
Friday, Dec. 4, 1992, at 18.
2 "The relative openness of Bosnia to influences from Croatia in the north and from
Serbia in the south and east facilitated invasion and conquest from Croats, Hungarians, Serbs,
Macedonians, Byzantines and Turks." SINGLETON, supra note 19, at 31.
28 A census of 1520-30 showed an increase in Muslim Bosnians to 46% from 18.4% in
1489; the Muslims in Bosnia today are descendants of those converts. Id. at 20.
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nineteenth century, the Turkish Muslims developed a reputation for religious
persecution that consequentially contributes to Serbian resentment today.29
Serbia, backed by the Orthodox Russian government, gained independence
from the Turks in 1878.' However, much to the chagrin of the newly
autonomous Serbian nation, Bosnia-Herzegovina merely shifted from Turkish
control to Austrian annexation in 1908.31 Then, as now, Bosnia-
Herzegovina had a large Serb population and when Austrian Archduke Franz
Ferdinand visited Sarajevo, Bosnia on Serbia's national day, he was killed
by radical Serbian nationalists there.32 As a result, Austria had its excuse
for territorial aggression against Serbia and the First World War ensued.
Serbia, despite a courageous effort, fell under Austrian occupation during
the war. Many Serbs fled to the Adriatic Coast in exile where, with other
Southern Slavs in exile, they agreed to form a united nation of South Slavs
upon termination of foreign occupation.33 The defeat of the Austrian
alliance led to the creation of this unified South Slav state in 1918. The
victorious allies formed the nation by taking the former Austrian territories
of Croatia, Slovenia and Bosnia-Herzegovina and connecting them to Serbia
and Montenegro. The nation, then known as the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats,
9 Id. at 21-22; see also, Statement of Holly Burkhalter, supra note 14 (reporting that
Serbs refer to Bosnian Muslims as Bosnian Muslim Turks as an ethnic slur).
3 Inspired by western influence in the region, Serbians formed a united front to expel the
Turks in the mid-nineteenth century. Serbia was recognized as a state at the Berlin Congress
in 1878. Nier, supra note 2, at 305.
31 Due in part to the influence of the French revolution, the 19th century was a time of
growing nationalism in the Balkans. This nationalism created animosity against the Austro-
Hungarians as well as the Turks. As the Balkans strived for independence, other nations in
Europe sought to assert their influence in the region to gain a strategical advantage. Thus the
region became a political battle ground with the Russians backing the Orthodox Slavs, and
the Austro-Hungarians asserting control over the Roman Catholics. When Austria annexed
Bosnia-Herzegovina in violation of the agreement reached at the Congress of Berlin, it
infuriated Serbia which had just recently gained its own independence from the Turks.
Greenway, supra note 12.
32 The visit of Archduke Ferdinand was anticipated to offend the Serbs within Bosnia.
The choice of Serbia's national day as the date of the visit has been compared to sending a
member of the British royal family to Dublin on St Patrick's day at the height of the British
resentment there. It may be inferred that the Austrians hoped for a violent reaction by the
local Serb population as an excuse for territorial aggression to add Serbia to its empire. Nier,
supra note 2, at 306.
3' The agreement was officially formed with the Declaration of Corfu on July 20, 1917.
Nier, supra note 2, at 307.
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and Slovenes, was renamed Yugoslavia in 1929.3 By this time in history,
however, the inhabitants of this new nation, though of common ethnic origin,
were a heterogeneous population with different concepts of national identity.
In the years following World War I, the new nation of Yugoslavia was an
amalgamation of different religious, linguistic, cultural, and political groups
that could not easily form a unified national identity. The Croats saw the
new nation as an equal partnership between themselves and the Serbs.
Serbians viewed the new union as merely an enlarged Serbia. All the while,
the individual and defining characteristics of the smaller communities within
the new nation formed a bond of cultural identity that was stronger than any
concept of Yugoslav nationality.35 These differences evolved into friction
between the various groups seeking power within the political framework of
the new nation.
Because they represented the largest ethnic group within the new nation
and because they fought on the side of the victors in the war with Austria,
the Serbs envisioned themselves as the natural leader and dominant power
within Yugoslavia. The technologically and industrially superior Slovenes
and Croats resented this domination and in many ways retained an identity
that was distinctly western.' Bosnia, even with its large Serb and Croat
populations, also contained a large Muslim population which was, of course,
descended from those who converted over to the religion of the hated Turks.
World War II did little to ease the ethnic tensions in Yugoslavia as Nazi
occupation resulted in genocidal mass executions between the ethnic
populations.37  Three main factions developed within the region. In
Croatia, the Nazi-like Croat organization known as Ustashi (or Ustaxhi)
conducted a campaign of ethnic purification aimed at the Serbs within
3 Id.
3- While the notion of a unified state may have had some meaning to some, the majority
of the population within the newly formed nation viewed government from a cynic's
perspective. Their view of government was a body that taxed their labor, drafted their sons,
and threatened their liberty without representation. Rather than trust a government, these
people based their loyalty on the religious and cultural identity they knew in their immediate
community. SINGLETON, supra note 19, at 131-133.
'6 The Croats and Slovenes, both former members of the Austrian Empire, resented the
Serbs who they considered "uncultured and eastern." Greenway, supra note 12.
"' A genocidal Nazi-like Croat organization known as the Ustashi practiced extermination
of Serbs, as well as Jews and Gypsies in Croatia. This action met with retaliation on the part
of Serb nationalists who carried out massacres of Croat and Muslim populations in mixed
areas. Id.
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Croatia. 38 Two other political groups formed to combat the Germans and
the Ustasa. One of the groups, known as the Chetniks, favored a greater
Serbia under the rule of a Yugoslav monarchy, and the other group was a
Communist organization under the command of Josip Broz Tito who had
aligned himself with the Soviet Union. Though united in their hatred for the
Germans, these two groups were too dissimilar and eventually fought each
other.3
From the turmoil of World War II, Tito's communist group emerged as
the leaders of a unified nation. Due in large part to his personal strength and
vision, Tito guided his nation under the new Federative People's Republic
of Yugoslavia, together under communist rule with unprecedented success. 40
However, when Tito died in 1980, he left a nation without its unifying
force.4'
The political leaders that followed based their strength on ethnic and
regional interests.42 In June of 1991, Croatia and Slovenia declared
independence resulting in an on again, off again civil war in Croatia between
the local Roman Catholic Croats and the Orthodox Christian Serb minority
38 Id. The Ustashi was responsible for numerous atrocities against the Serbs in Croatia.
Nier, supra note 2, at 308.
" Throughout the war, Yugoslavia was the battleplace of several mini-wars: the war
against the Germans, the war against the Ustashi, and the war between the Chetniks and the
Communists. Nier, supra note 2, at 309.
o Yugoslavia under Tito's leadership was renowned for its impressive social, economic,
cultural, and political advancements. Tito himself was instrumental in the unification of
Yugoslavia; under his leadership, Yugoslavia endured as a unified state longer than any
previous unified Southern Slav nation. Id.
"' The transition began smoothly but without the single source of strength to lead the
government that Tito demonstrated. Factions developed within the collective leadership.
Adding to the divisive elements were the economic deterioration in the early 1980's and the
Kosovo revolution in Serbia in 1981. RAMET, supra note 21, at xvii.
Croatia and Slovenia were the more prosperous and industrious regions in Yugoslavia. As
such they no longer wished to subsidize the poorer republics such as Serbia. Serbia, by
contrast wanted to retain its power over the government institutions and in so doing continue
to receive the economic advantages of association with Slovenia and Croatia. Conflict among
the leaders of these regions heightened in 1991, when Serbia and its allies blocked the
rotation of the country's presidency to Stipe Mesic, a Croat who the Serbs and their President
Slobodan Milosevic feared would assist in de-centralization. Nier, supra note 2, at 310.
42 RAMET, supra note 21 at xvii; see also Gow, supra note 21, at 7-8 (noting that no
individual could assume Tito's role, but rather those in power represented provincial
interests).
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with the backing of the Serb dominated Yugoslavian Army.4 3 Just as the
regional and ethnic concerns led Croatia and Slovenia to declare indepen-
dence, those same concerns persuaded the Roman Catholic Croats within
Bosnia and Muslim Bosnians to unite in a majority vote for independence
in early March of 1992." The European Community recognized the
independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina a month later.45 The next day, April
7, Bosnian Serbs declared their own independence from the newly recog-
nized state of Bosnia-Herzegovina as fighting among the Croats, Muslims
and Serbs there escalated into civil war. As in Croatia, the Yugoslav Army
sided with the Serb rebels. 46 More than seventeen thousand had died
fighting by late January, 1993 with an additional two million refugees
remaining in Bosnia.47
4' Slovenia and Croatia, resenting the economic drain of the less wealthy southern
republics, pushed for democratic governments in their own region and a loose federation for
all the republics of Yugoslavia. Serbia, dissimilarly, wanted to retain the communist system
with a strong centralized government which could retain the resources of the other republics
while protecting the Serb minorities within them. Nier, supra note 2, at 310.
"Of the almost two million citizens who turned out to vote, ninety nine per cent voted
in favor of an independent and autonomous republic with those opposed to the election,
primarily Christian Orthodox Serbs within Bosnia, boycotting the election. Bosnian
Independence Proclaimed, NEwSDAY, Mar. 4, 1992, at 15.
Forty-two per cent of the population of Bosnia-Herzegovina is Muslim, with thirty two per
cent Serb and seventeen per cent Croat. Nick Thorpe, Yugoslavia: Muslims in Serbian
Gunsights - Bosnia Declares Independence, Reuter Textline Observer (Oct. 20, 1991).
The Muslim and Roman Catholic Croat populations in Bosnia fear economic and political
domination by communist-ruled Serbia, just as the people of Croatia and Slovenia, shortly
before their independence. Bosnia-Herzegovina decides to seek independence, supra note 7.
' The European Community agreed to recognize the independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina
on April 6, 1992. EC Recognizes Independence of Bosnia -Herzegovina, supra note 10.
46 Carol J. Williams, supra, note 6. Whereas Croatia and Slovenia had the industry that
Serbia and the centralized Yugoslav government could not afford to loose, Bosnia is the home
of many ethnic Serbs and most of the federal army's defense industries:
The Yugoslav People's Army purged its top ranks of moderates and non-
Serbs just two days before the referendum (for Bosnian independence on
March 3), and the pro-Serbian presidency that commands it has vowed
not to pull troops out of Bosnia even if voters decide to secede....
Bosnia is home to about 1.35 million Serbs and most of Yugoslavia's
defense industries.
Id.
4' In addition, ten thousand have died in Croatia where fighting resumed again in January
1992 after a year long ceasefire. Chronology of Yugoslav War, Press Ass'n Newsfile (Jan.
23, 1993).
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III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
In the sixteenth century, Grotius charged that certain acts against
individuals violated the "law of nature or of nations" thereby solidifying the
conceptual notion of crimes against humanity.4 The term genocide, 49
however, did not arrive until Dr. Raphael Lemkin introduced the phrase in
response to Winston Churchill's description of Nazi crimes in Poland as
"crime[s] without a name."' ° Inspired by the Nuremberg prosecutions and
the need for the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide,"' the
General Assembly of the United Nations unanimously adopted Resolution
96()2 establishing genocide as a crime under international law and
appealing to member states to enact legislation for the prevention and
punishment of genocide. Two years later, on December 9, 1948, the General
Assembly approved a draft of the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Genocide Convention).53
Bunyan Bryant, Substantive Scope of the Convention, 16 HARVARD INT'L L. J. 686
(1975) (citing Goldberg, Crimes Against Humanity, 10 W. ONT. L.R. 27 (1971)).
" The term is derived from the Greek word genos which means race, and the Latin word
cide, meaning killing. R. LEMPKIN, Axis RULES IN OCCUPIED EUROPE 79 (1944).
"o Kutner, A World Genocide Tribunal-Rampart Against Future Genocide: Proposal For
Planetary Preventive Measures Supplementing A Genocide Early Warning System, 18 VAL.
U. L. REV. 373, at 378 (1983), (citing 127 Cong. Rec. S10519 (Daily ed. Sept. 25, 1981)
(statement of Sen. Proxmire quoting Winston Churchill)).
"' The drafting records indicate that the overriding purpose of the genocide convention
was to prevent the recurrence of genocide by assuring punishment of offenders. Diane F.
Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty To Prosecute Human Rights Violations Of A Prior
Regime 100 YALE L.J. 2537, at 2563 n.105 (1991) (citing U.N. GAOR, 178th, 179th plen.
mtg., at 811 (remarks of Soviet delegate); id. at 819 (remarks of delegate from Pakistan); id.
at 820 (remarks of U.S. delegate); id. at 823 (remarks of Australian delegate); id. at 840
(remarks of Polish delegate).
52 On December 11, 1946, the United Nations General Assembly passed Resolution 96-I
which defined genocide as "the denial of the right of existence of entire human groups" such
as to shock the conscience. G.A. Res. 96(l), U.N. Doc. A/231 (1946).
" Kurtner, supra note 50, at 379. The Convention came into force on January 12, 1951
after twenty instruments of ratification or accession had been deposited in accordance with
Article XIII of the Convention. One of the original states to ratify the convention was
Yugoslavia on August 29, 1950. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide,
78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Genocide Convention].
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A. An Overview of the Genocide Convention
The first four articles of the Genocide Convention prescribe the substan-
tive principles that now constitute the crime of genocide by declaring
genocide "a crime under international law,"' defining genocide as any one
of an enumerated list of acts," designating what acts of genocide constitute
"punishable acts,"" and establishing persons punishable for committing
genocide under the convention." Articles V through IX procedurally
effectuate the substantive principles of the Convention through a call for
local legislation,"8 establishment of jurisdiction,59 defining obligations of
extradition,60 and recognition of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) as
the forum for resolving disputes of interpretation and state responsibility.6'
Articles V through IX envision enforcement through domestic and interna-
tional procedures. Nevertheless, the vagueness of definition in the former
substantive articles and the intrinsic weakness of the enforcement mecha-
-" Genocide Convention art. I.
55 Article II of the Genocide Convention states:
In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts
committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethical,
racial or religious group as such:
(a) Killing members of a group:
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to
bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
Genocide Convention art. II.
s Article III of the Genocide Convention provides:
The following acts shall be punishable:
(a) Genocide;
(b) Conspiracy to commit genocide;
(c) Direct and public incitement to commit genocide;
(d) Attempt to commit genocide;
(e) Complicity in genocide.
Genocide Convention art. III.
Genocide Convention art. IV. provides: "[plersons committing genocide or any of the
other acts enumerated in article III shall be punished, whether they are constitutionally
responsible rulers, public officials or private individuals."
s Genocide Convention art. V.
s Genocide Convention art. VI.
60 Genocide Convention art. VII.
61 Genocide Convention art. IX.
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nisms provided in the latter procedural articles hinder enforcement of the
Genocide Convention.62
The Genocide Convention is not currently enforced on the international
level largely because questions of substance and procedure are still
unanswered. Though over 100 states have ratified the Convention, no
international tribunal has been established to prosecute individuals for
offenses under the Convention leaving questions of procedure up to
individual states. 3 In some instances, a state whose political leaders are
Situations that arguably call for enforcement have in the past resulted in non-
enforcement. The call for application of the Convention in the wake of religious and cultural
persecution of the Buddhist population in Tibet by the People's Republic of China in 1959
and 1960 was not answered despite evidence of "killing religious leaders, desecrating
Buddhist sanctuaries, prohibiting the practice of the Buddhist religion, and forcibly
transferring thousands of Tibetan children to China in an attempt to destroy the Tibetans as
a religious group." Paul Starkman, Genocide and International Law; Is there a Cause of
Action?, 8 ASILS Int'l L.J. 1, at 13,14 (1984).
Similarly the call for application of the Convention after the use of natural disaster and
starvation on the part of the Ethiopian government to gain control of Eritrea in 1988 fell upon
deaf ears. Jean E. Zeiler, The Applicability of the Genocide Convention to Government
Imposed Famine in Eritria, 19 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 589 (1989) ("Mengistu is engaged
in a deliberate, genocidal attempt to starve the Eritrean people into submission"); see also
Lawrence J. LeBlanc, The Intent to Destroy Groups in the Genocide Convention; the
Proposed U.S. Understanding, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 369, at 380 (1984).
Another example of non-enforcement may be found in the continuous treatment of the
Ache' Indians in Paraguay. The Indians stand in the way of government cultivation of the
rain forests. Because of their stance it has been asserted that the government has sought to
eradicate the Indians. Several organizations have charged the Paraguay government of
attempting to exterminate the Ache' Indians through killing, starving, and incarceration on
controlled reservations. "When pressed on the issue, however, the Paraguayan Government
cloaked itself in the words 'intent to destroy.' In short, the government claimed that there
was no intent to destroy the Ache' Indians, hence genocide was not being committed."
Zeiler, supra, at 604.
Other claims have been made in regard to actions against Bengalis and Hindus by East
Pakistan, actions of Pol Pot in Cambodia (1975-78), and practices of Idi Amin in Uganda
(1971-1978). Id.; see also, German Parliament Wants Serbs Branded For Genocide, The
Reuters Lib. Rep. (July 22, 1992) (noting that the U.N. convention against genocide has been
difficult to apply, even to the mass killings of a million people under the Khmer Fouge in
Cambodia where there was no definitive ethnic group fighting another).
63 Kutner, supra note 50, at 387.
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accused of genocide may be required under article VI to punish itself.'
Additionally, given the ambiguity of language within the first four articles,
particularly article II which describes "intent" and defines the victimized
"group," there is a great deal of flexibility allowing nations to obscure issues
and avoid judicial scrutiny.6
B. Substantive Issues
The substantive heart of the Convention is article II which defines
genocide as follows:
In the present Convention, genocide means any of the
following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or
in part, a national, ethical, racial or religious group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of
the group:
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life
calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or
in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the
group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another
group.66
To meet the minimum requirements of this definition, three elements are
necessary: (1) an identifiable national, ethical, racial or religious group as the
victim; (2) an intent to destroy the group in whole or in part; and (3)
identifiable acts in conjunction with the intent to destroy the identified group
"Article VI allows that "persons charged with genocide ... be tried by a competent
tribunal of the State in the territory of which the act was committed." Genocide Convention,
art. VI.
It is doubtful that any one person is capable of committing genocide. More likely, acts of
genocide are committed under government direction. However, a government that would
commit genocide would not likely allow its own law to be exercised against itself. M. Cherif
Bassiouni, International Law and the Holocaust, 9 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 201, at 252 (1979).
6 See LeBlanc, supra note 62 at 380 and Starkman, supra note 62, at 38, giving examples
such as the situation of the Ache' Indians in Paraguay.
6Genocide Convention, art. II.
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victim.
1. Defining the Victim
The plain language of article II classifies the victim of genocide as a
member of one of the identifiable but limited groups listed: a national,
ethical, social, or religious group. Political groups are conspicuously not on
the list because some states feared that the inclusion of such an arguably
unstable category would create an obstacle to the Convention's ratification.
Unfortunately, an unscrupulous entity could attempt to avoid application of
the Convention in cases of discriminate killings by labelling the victims as
a political group.6"
2. Intent
Related to the question of an identifiable group is the question of intent.
Once the victimized group is identified, the plain language of article II states
that it is the INTENT to destroy, in whole or in part, a group combined with
the acts to carry out this intent that constitute a violation of the Convention.
Thus genocide occurs when the intent is to eradicate the individuals for no
other reason than that they are a member of the specified group. The
destruction of this group without the intent to eliminate the group may be
construed as something other than genocide.6 Conversely, an unsuccessful
attempt to eradicate a'group may be punishable under article II if accompa-
nied by the requisite intent to do so.69
Further clouding the question of intent is the issue of scope. An assault on
members of an identified group, motivated by their inclusion within that
group, is not genocide unless accompanied by an intent to destroy that group
67Through the assertion of what amounts to an affirmative defense, the accused state may
characterize victims as "political" or "economic" opponents, or even deny that the group
exists at all, and in doing so avoid responsibility under the Convention. Starkman, supra note
62, at 37.
6 "An intended action that results in destruction of a group without intent to eliminate
the group is not genocide." P. DROST, THE CRIME OF STATE 82 (1959), quoted in Zeiler,
supra note 62, at 604; see also Kutner, supra note 50, at 381 (noting that "[a]cts committed
without intent are not within the purview of the Convention").
' It is not necessary that the actual destruction of the group occurs if intent is shown.
Kutner, supra note 50, at 381.
19931
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
in whole or in part.7 The ordinary language of article II therefore suggests
that genocide does not require the intent to eliminate the whole group, but
rather an intent to eliminate the group "in part" is sufficient. Still, it has
been argued that intent must contemplate elimination of the entire group,
although the actions may eliminate only a portion of the group.7' This
distinction has added significance when one considers that the number of
victims may play a key evidentiary factor.72 The victim count can be used
to demonstrate intent, especially if the aggressor has not expressly asserted
his genocidal intention beyond his actions. Therefore, a flexible interpreta-
tion of intent is critical if the Convention is to become applicable before an
excessive portion of the identified group is eliminated.73
3. Acts
Compared to the vagaries of defining "intent," finding the requisite "acts"
is clear. Article II lists specific acts. If any acts are perpetrated with the
intent to destroy in whole or in part the identified national, ethical, racial or
religious group, genocide has been committed. 74  These acts vary from
killing members of the group to the forced transfer of children from one
group to another, but all the acts listed in article II possess one common
characteristic: each act listed depicts an action or actions which would
" Bassiouni, supra note 64, at 251; see also Bryant, supra note 48, at 691 explaining the
scope of article 11:
From the ordinary meaning of article II of the Genocide Convention,
it would seem that the killing of a single person could be considered
genocide if the killing were done with the intent to destroy, in whole or
in part, the national, ethical, racial, or religious group of which the victim
was a member. On the other hand, without this intent to destroy the
group, in whole or in part, mass killings of members of the group would
presumably not constitute genocide under the Convention.
Id. at 691.
"I Some representatives of the Sixth Committee argued that the intent must be to destroy
an entire group, but that genocide could be accomplished in stages, initially affecting only
parts of the group. LeBlanc, supra note 62, at 374.
72 Bryant supra note 48, at 692.
"' Recognizing the costly evidentiary burden that a requirement of the killing of a very
high proportion of group members would impose for application of the Convention, the
drafters found it imperative to specify that partial destruction of a group would constitute
genocide. Id. at 692.
74 See supra note 55.
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contribute to the destruction of the victim group in whole or in part.
. The first act described in article II(a), killing members of the group, is a
straight forward criteria, but a significant number of group members killed
may be required to prove intent. Though it is the most obvious act, killing
is not an essential act to constitute genocide. Sections (b) through (e) pose
alternative methods such as causing bodily or mental harm, inflicting
conditions of life intended to destroy the group, preventing births within the
group, and forcibly transferring children from one group to another.
Section (b)-"causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the
group,"-contains broad language that requires some degree of interpretation.
No definition of the "mental harm" referred to in section (b) exists elsewhere
in the article. However, if section (b) is read in context with the rest of
article II, "mental harm" would seem to describe the sort of psychological
damage inflicted upon members of the group that would lead to the
destruction of that group.75 The "mental harm" need not be permanent, nor
particularly brutal to constitute the requisite "act" so long as the group can
be effectively destroyed through psychological destruction.76 Similarly, the
conceivable destruction of the group is the requisite behind section
(c)----"deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to
bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part,"-section
(d)--"imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group,"-and
section (e)-"forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. ' 77
C. Jurisdiction and Extradition
1. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Although the language of Article VI suggests that the drafters envisioned
the creation of a world criminal court, such a court has yet to be established.
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) is evidence that a world court is
possible, but the ICJ is itself limited in that it cannot hear claims against
73 See Bryant, supra note 48, at 694 (noting that racial, ethnic, or religious epithets are
not applicable to the Genocide Convention since they "lack the potential to destroy the
group").
76 Bryant gives as an example of mental harm a situation where drugs or brainwashing
may be used to prevent parents of a group from instructing their children in the characteristic
ways of their group, thus destroying the group, even if the harm to the individual member of
the group is reversible. Id. at 694.
" Genocide Convention, art. II.
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individuals.7 Absent an international criminal court, jurisdiction over
enforcement of the Genocide Convention against individuals is limited to
domestic tribunals.79  The plain language of article VI-"persons charged
... shall be tried by a competent tribunal of the State in the territory of
which the act was committed"-designates jurisdiction,W° but there remains
some question as to the limiting effect of this language. Whereas a narrow
interpretation of the language leads to a conclusion that the express terms of
article VI limit jurisdiction exclusively to the state where the offense
7" Only a state may be a party to a contentious case before the International Court of
Justice. International organizations and private persons are excluded. RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 903 cmt. a.
As early as 1949, the United Nations International Law Commission (ILC) concluded that
an international criminal court is both desirable, and possible. However, as of yet, the only
international criminal tribunals established were the much criticized ad hoc Nuremberg and
Tokyo tribunals (neither Germany nor Japan participated in the formation of these tribunals
which were criticized for violating due process through pre-judgment of guilt, judicial bias,
application of ex post facto laws, judges with unclean hands, and procedural irregularities).
Michael P. Scharf, The Jury is Still Out on The Need for an International Criminal Court, 1
DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 135, at 138-139 (1).
Early attempts to create an international criminal court and a draft Code of Offenses
Against the Peace and Security of Mankind were stalled due to a lack of agreement over the
definition of aggression. There is, however, evidence of a new call for the establishment of
an international criminal court. In 1990, the ILC, U.N. Crime Congress, and the ABA, have
all endorsed the concept of an international criminal court. Despite this evidence of growing
support for the establishment of such a court, no such court yet exists. Id. at 135-139.
Genocide Convention, art. VI.
o Article VI appears to grant jurisdiction exclusively to the territorial state, but a
resolution adopted by a majority of the Legal Committee when considering the Convention
professed that the article nonetheless allows any State to bring its own nationals to trial for
acts committed outside the forum State. Robert H. Jones, Jurisdiction and Extradition Under
the Convention, 16 HARV. INT'L L.J. 696, (citing 3 U.N. GAOR, 1st part, 6th Comm., at 717,
U.N. Doc. A/633 (1948)); see also SENATE COMMIrEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, REPORT ON
THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR THE PREVENTION AND PUNISHMENT OF THE CRIME
OF GENOCIDE, EXEC. REPT. 99-2, 99th Cong. 1st Sess., 23 (1985) [hereinafter REPORT ON
GENOCIDE CONVENTION] commenting on nationality jurisdiction:
That the pledge to grant extradition in accordance with a state's laws and
treaties in force found in Article VII extends only to acts which are
criminal under the laws of both the requesting and the requested state and
nothing in Article VI affects the right of any state to bring to trial before
its own tribunals any of its nationals for acts committed outside a state.
Id. at 23.
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occurred,"' a more subjective interpretation might conclude that the
Convention did not remove the sovereign right of a nation to try its own
citizen. At least the majority of states in the Sixth Committee, including the
United States, intended that the Convention would not deprive them of the
fundamental attribute of sovereignty through the right to try their own
citizens. 2 Therefore, under a subjective analysis, article VI would have to
include nationality jurisdiction thereby allowing a state to adjudicate a claim
against its own national.
Notwithstanding the language of article VI, the territorial jurisdiction 3
established by the Convention may not be exclusive under international law.
Should a state find difficulty meeting the subject matter jurisdiction expressly
provided within the Genocide Convention, it could argue for universal
jurisdiction under customary law, Universal jurisdiction under customary
law allows any state to take jurisdiction over genocidal acts, regardless of the
offender's nationality and place of commission."
l The terms of the article are not ambiguous ("persons charged shall be tried by a
competent tribunal of the State in the territory of which the act was committed") and if the
signatory states wished to give concurrent jurisdiction they could have. In addition, though
such concurrent jurisdiction was favored by a majority of the Sixth Committee, all the
signatories did not, nor is there any evidence that such an interpretation was acquiesced in the
resolution. Finally, because the accused may have been acting on orders from the government
of his state of nationality, such an interpretation in favor of concurrent jurisdiction would be
contrary to the object and purpose of the Convention. Jones, supra note 80 at 698, (citing
3 U.N. GAOR 1st part, 6th Comm. at 718, U.N. Doc. A/633 (1948)).
8 This is the current understanding of the United States Government. Id. at 699; see
also REPORT ON GENOCIDE CONVENTION, supra note 80 at 23 (providing "nothing in Article
VI affects the right of any state to bring to trial before its own tribunals any of its nationals
for acts committed outside a state").
83 The territorial principle provides that a state may assert jurisdiction over genocidal acts
taking place substantially within its territorial boundaries. Starkman, supra note 62, at 46.
8 Universal jurisdiction expands jurisdiction to any state, regardless of the situs of the
crime, victim, or offender, due to the inhuman nature of the offence. Id. at 49; See also
Orentlicher, supra note 51, at 2562 (noting that customary law establishes universal
jurisdiction over human rights violations). Universal jurisdiction for the crime of genocide
was widely accepted after Nuremberg, although no state has exercised universal jurisdiction
where no other basis for jurisdiction exists. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
OF THE UNITED STATES § 404 (1987), Reporter's notes 1. Israel relied in part on universal
jurisdiction in the Eichmann case. See Israel v. Eichmann, 36 INT'L L. REP. 277 (Sup. Ct.
Israel 1962). Id. (citing 36 INT'L L. REP. 277 (Sup. Ct. Israel 1962)). In Matter of Barbie,
the Supreme Court of France ruled that the charges against the defendant transcended local
rules of procedure since they implicated crimes against all humanity, as defined by, among
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2. Personal Jurisdiction/Extradition
Assuming a tribunal procures subject matter jurisdiction, the tribunal must
pass the additional procedural hurdle of obtaining jurisdiction over the
defendant. Article IV provides the basis for jurisdiction over individuals,
including high ranking public officials by mandating punishment for all
persons committing genocide "whether they are constitutionally responsible
rulers, public officials or private individuals."
5
Thus the next procedural hurdle for trying the crime of genocide is gaining
custody over the defendant. Extradition is the usual method of gaining
custody over a defendant located in a foreign land. Extradition requires the
exercise of territorial sovereignty by one state over individuals within its
borders for the benefit of prosecution and punishment by another state.8
Article VII of the Genocide Convention mandates that "[c]ontracting Parties
pledge themselves in [cases of genocide] to grant extradition in accordance
with their laws and treaties in force." 7 Such an exercise, however, is not
obligatory absent an extradition treaty between the nations. 8
Unless the defendant is already within the state asserting jurisdiction or a
state willing to extradite the accused, asserting personal jurisdiction will be
an immense obstacle. Given that such accused individuals may be high
ranking public officials as article IV suggests, convincing a state to extradite,
even if an extradition treaty exists, may not be possible absent an uncondi-
tional surrender.89
other things, the Charter of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg. Id. (citing
[1983] Gaz. Pal. Jur. 710 (Cass. crim. Oct. 6, 1983)).
5 Genocide Convention, art. IV.
" Extradition is defined as follows: "The surrender by one state or country to another
of an individual accused or convicted of an offense outside its own territory and within the
territorial jurisdiction of the other, which, being competent to try and punish him, demands
the surrender." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 585 (6th ed. 1990).
Genocide Convention, art. VII.
The Genocide Convention explicitly recognizes this limitation. In the Convention, state
parties pledge only to grant extradition "in accordance with [their] laws and treaties in force."
Id.
" Article VII of the Genocide Convention provides that a request for extradition must be
complied with regardless of the political offense exception, but it does not otherwise facilitate
extradition causing states to resort to extralegal methods of gaining personal jurisdiction.
Starkman, supra note 62, at 51 n.240.
[Vol. 23:377
GENOCIDE TREATY
3. Jurisdiction Over States
Although the language of article IV applies to individuals, including state
officials, it does not imply that a state could not or should not also take
accountability for acts of genocide. Draft Articles on State Responsibility
composed by the ILC classify genocide as an international crime subject to
state responsibility," suggesting that a state should be subject to adjudica-
tion.91
Article IX of the Genocide Convention appears to establish compulsory
ICJ jurisdiction for adjudication against states:
Disputes between the Contracting Parties relating to the
interpretation, application or fulfillment of the present
Convention, including those relating to the responsibility of
a State for genocide or for any of the other acts enumerated
in article III, shall be submitted to the International Court of
Justice at the request of any of the parties to the dispute.'
Realistically speaking, however, this provision lacks strength in application.
A significant number of states, including the United States, have filed
go Article 19 states in relevant part:
1. An act of a State which constitutes a breach of an international
obligation is an internationally wrongful act, regardless of the subject-
matter of the obligation breached.
2. An internationally wrongful act which results from the breach by a
State of international obligation so essential for the protection of
fundamental interests of the international community that its breach is
recognized as a crime by that community as a whole constitutes an
international crime.
3. Subject to paragraph 2, and on the basis of the rules of international
law in force, an international crime may result, inter alia, from: ...
(c) a serious breach on a widespread scale of an international obligation
of essential importance for safeguarding the human being, such as those
prohibiting slavery, genocide and apartheid; ....
Draft Articles on State Responsibility, Report of the International Law Commission to the
General Assembly, 35 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 10 at 49, 59-68, U.N. Doc. A/35/10 (1980).
9' "In order to seriously contemplate state responsibility for genocide, it is imperative that
the dialogue rise to the level of formal adjudication, rather than mere allegation." Starkman,
supra note 62, at 26.
9 Genocide Convention, art. IX.
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reservations to article IX.93 Furthermore, states may attempt to assert their
sovereign right to refuse to submit to jurisdiction before the ICJ or to
recognize its judgments. 9' Even if the jurisdiction of the ICJ is considered
compulsory under article IX, there is no guarantee that the accused state will
choose to attend or comply with decisions of the court.95
While the Convention provides jurisdiction over individuals in domestic
courts, it makes no reference to jurisdiction over states beyond the ICJ. No
rule of international law forbids states to adjudicate claims of genocide
committed by another state, but the domestic courts have limited competence
under international law to adjudicate claims brought against foreign
sovereign states." Aside from these difficulties, a foreign state such as
Yugoslavia or its republics may claim immunity from adjudication and
execution of claims against it in the-domestic forum of another sovereign
state due to lack of consent to jurisdiction.7
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Article II Violations
The alleged incidents of "ethnic cleansing" in the former Yugoslavia
would provide the ideal working model for application of article II of the
" Genocide Convention Implementation Act of 1987, 28 LL.M. 754, 779-84 (1988).
94 Starkman, supra note 62, at 27.
95 See Mark W. Janis, Somber Reflections on the Compulsory Jurisdiction of the
International Court, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 144 (1987), (giving the following examples of
compulsory jurisdiction cases before the ICJ that were plagued by missing defendants: Iceland
in the Fisheries Jurisdiction cases, France in the Nuclear Tests Cases, Turkey in the Aegean
Sea Continental Shelf case, Iran in the Diplomatic and Consular Staff case, and the United
States in the Military and Paramilitary Activities case).
" A domestic court can not have valid subject matter jurisdiction over the offense unless
by virtue of its national law and can not have jurisdiction over a foreign state unless by virtue
of a recognized principle of jurisdiction in international law. Starkman, supra note 49, at 34-
35; see also RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (REVISED)
§ 451 providing:
Under international law, a state or state instrumentality is immune from
the jurisdiction of the courts of a foreign state, but not with respect to
claims arising out of activities in the foreign state of the kind that may be
carried on by private persons.
Starkman, supra note 62, at 36 (citing United Nations, Materials on Jurisdictional
Immunities of States and Their Property, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/Ser.B1/20 (1982)).
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Genocide Convention. The following indispensable elements of article II are
present in the situation in the former Yugoslavia and should be explored in
a judicial proceeding: (1) an established identifiable national, ethical, racial
or religious group as the victim; (2) an intent to destroy the group or groups
in whole or in part; and (3) identifiable acts in conjunction with the intent
to destroy the identified group victim.98
1. Bosnian Muslims, Croats, and Serbs are Identifiable Victims within the
Meaning of "Group" in Article 11
Article II requires the existence of an identifiable national, ethnic, racial
or religious group as the victim. An ethnic group is distinguishable as a
religious, racial, national or cultural group." Bosnian Muslims fit this
description as well regardless of interpretation of ethnicity."° Although it
could be argued that Bosnian Muslims are of the same Slavic ethnicity as
Serbs, the fact that they constitute a separate religious, social, and at least
arguably national block suggests that article II would apply.
Similarly, Croats fall within the definition of "ethnic group" as well as the
meaning of "group" in article II. Though Christian like Serbs, Croats belong
to the Roman Catholic sect as opposed to the Orthodox Serbs. Additionally,
the Croats constitute a separate nationality due to the independence of the
former Yugoslav republic of Croatia.
Although most of the attention has been focused on the alleged "ethnic
cleansing" on the part of Serbians against Bosnian Muslims and Croats, it
must be recognized that many Serbs have also been the victims of ethnic
violence within other ethnic enclaves in Bosnia and they too are within the
meaning of "group" in article II. In some areas dominated by Bosnian
Muslims or Croats, Serbs are, as they have been in the past,'01 subject to
persecution because of their ethnicity, religion and nationality with possible
98 See infra section IH1(A) for an explanation of these substantive requirements.
"THE AMERICAN HERrrAGE DICTIONARY 467 (2d ed. 1982).
100 Prior to 1971, perhaps due to their common South Slav origin, census officials did not
even consider Bosnian Muslims a separate ethnic category. Though not recognized as a
separate ethnic group until the 1971 census, Muslims today constitute the largest ethnic block
in Bosnia. Greenway, supra note 12, at .18.
... See supra note 37 (describing the Croat Ustaxhi and their genocidal extermination of
Serbs).
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genocidal implications."°
Though Bosnian Muslims, Croats and Serbs share the same South Slavic
ancestry, they have nonetheless developed separate religious, national and
cultural identities. Because of these differences between groups, any acts
committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, members of the
other groups would constitute genocidal action against an identifiable victim
within the meaning of article II.
2. "Ethnic Cleansing" on the Part of Military and Paramilitary Forces
Against the Bosnian Muslim, Croat, and Serb Civilian Populations in the
Former Yugoslavia Implies Genocidal Intent
In cases of civil war, the issue of intent can be easily clouded. A strict
interpretation of intent, effectively used, may act as an affirmative defense
to charges of genocide."°3 In Bosnia, the motivation of the Serb forces has
been attributed to such factors as political gain"°4 and land grab. 5
Forces in Yugoslavia, whether they be Serb, Croat or Muslim, can assert that
their actions are primarily directed to suppress political rather than ethnic,
religious, social, or national groups.'6
'02 Findings of the Helsinki Watch indicate that serious abuses have occurred on all sides,
but "the conditions of detention in Serbian-controlled areas of Bosnia have been particularly
brutal." See U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (Helsinki Commission),
Fed. News Service (Jan. 6, 1993) (statement of D. Pokenpner).
Sources in Belgrade estimate that around 20,000 Serbs are being held captive in detention
camps in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia. The "Serbian Council", an independent institution
specializing in documenting crimes against Serbs in the former Yugoslavia, reported killings
of men in these camps as well as rape of men, women, and children. In addition, the source
indicated that Muslims are involved in the slave trade of Serbian children. Belgrade Centre
Says Around 20,000 Serbs Detained in Camps in Bosnia, Brit. Broadcasting Corp. (Mar. 1,
1993).
10 One example occurred in Brazil where the government denied charges of genocide
against Indians of the Amazon river by claiming an intent to take possession of their land
rather than to eradicate their existence, even though that may be the ultimate result. L.
KUPER, GENocIDE: ITS POLITICAL USE IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1981) cited in Kutner,
supra note 50, at 94.
104 See supra note 68 and accompanying text for discussion of "political intent" as an
affirmative defense.
10 See Statement of Holly Burkhalter, supra note 14 (noting that despite the centuries of
ethnic tension, what is really going on is a Serbian "land grab").
m0 See Statement of Rep. Wolf, supra note 13 (describing Serbian slaughter of rival ethnic
groups as an attempt to eliminate political opposition).
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As a result of this possible political action defense, the challenge for the
proponent of article II enforcement lies in distinguishing between acts of war
directed against a governmental opponent and acts of genocide against the
general population."° When the acts focus on the identified civilian group,
then the charge of genocide is appropriate." s  Thus where the facts are
clear, that "ethnic cleansing" is directed at a civilian population within one
of the described groups, ulterior motives such as political or territorial gain
should not form an appropriate defense to the charge of genocide) °9
Moreover, it should not be relevant that Serbs view Muslims and Croats
as political opponents. Where Serbian actions clearly demonstrate an attempt
to eradicate the civilian population of a group victim within the meaning of
article II, the claim of political action should not be an appropriate defense
to the charge of genocide. An analogous situation would arise should
Bosnian or Croat actions against Serb civilian populations take place, even
in a war for political independence.
Furthermore, assertions that intent is to eradicate only portions of the
identified group, whether Muslim, Serb, or Croat, should also fail. Though
some uncertainty exists concerning the scope of intent in this regard,"0 the
ordinary meaning of the language in Article II suggests that requisite intent
includes partial destruction of the identified group."' Thus, any defense
of intent to eradicate only a portion of the group would backfire as such
intentions will be punishable under Article II.
107 Zeiler recognized this problem in her article on the Eritrean situation:
Putting aside the question of the Eritreans' right to self-determination, the
difficulty lies in distinguishing genocide from deaths normally occurring
in the course of war. Inevitably, civilians die during a war, but a
legitimate war is directed against states/governments and armed forces,
and not against general populations.
Zeiler, supra note 62, at 605 (emphasis in original).
108 Id.
"o See supra notes 11-18 for specific examples of acts directed against civilian
populations.
"' See supra notes 68-74 and accompanying text for an analysis of the scope of genocidal
intent.
"' See Leblanc, supra note 62 at 374.
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3. Acts of "Ethnic Cleansing" are Intended to Destroy the Victimized
Group in Whole or in Part and Therefore are Acts of Genocide within the
Meaning of Article II
Article II lists several specific acts, each of which depicts an action or
actions which would contribute to the destruction of the victim group in
whole or in part. The atrocious acts committed in Bosnia certainly would
contribute to the destruction of the victim group in whole or in part and are
so numerous that every specific subdivision of Article II potentially applies.
The incidents of civilian killings are well documented and fall within the
definition of Article H(a) "killing members of the group." Similarly episodes
of torture, starvation, systematic rape in detention centers, and terrorization
in general fall within the scope of Article IH(b), "causing serious bodily or
mental harm to members of the group," and 11(c), "deliberately inflicting on
the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction
in whole or in part."' 1 2
Though less obvious, Article II(d), "imposing measures intended to
prevent births within the group," and II(e), "forcibly transferring children of
the group to another group," may also be applicable. Arguably, systematic
rape of women combined with the slaughter of males within an identified
group" 3 demonstrate an attempt to prevent further births within that group
and to transfer the offspring children of one group to another by forcing
Bosnian women to have only Serbian children." 4
These particular acts of "ethnic cleansing" in Yugoslavia clearly fall within
the substantive provisions set forth in article II. Killing, torture, rape,
starvation, the creation of refugees, and terrorization in general constitute
actions provided in the enumerated list of genocidal "acts" set forth in article
1.. See supra notes 11-18 and accompanying text for examples of ethnic killing, rape,
torture, burning of villages, the practice of creating refugees, the creation of ethnic ghettos
for the purpose of starvation, the creation of detention centers, and systematic abuse in
general.
'3 See Bosnia: Do Something, supra note 16 for specific examples of rape and killing in
Bosnia.
"4 It has been alleged that the intent of Serbs committing rape of Bosnian Muslim women
was to impregnate them with "Christian" babies. The Babies of Bosnia, THE GUARDIAN, Jan.
8, 1993.
Alternatively, Serbs have alleged that Bosnian Muslims are engaged in the slave trade of
Serbian children. Belgrade Centre Says Around 20,000 Serbs Detained in Camps in Bosnia,
supra, note 102.
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II. Taken as a whole, there can be little doubt that acts of "ethnic cleansing"
directed at an identifiable "group" within the meaning of the Genocide
Convention also contain the necessary element of intent to qualify these
actions as genocide within the meaning of Article II of the Convention.
B. Jurisdiction and Extradition
Regardless of the substantive applicability of the Genocide Convention, the
document will be of little use without access to a court for adjudication. It
is imperative that the international community come together and clear the
procedural hurdles that threaten application of the Genocide Convention to
atrocities in the former Yugoslavia.
1. Universal Subject Matter Jurisdiction for the Crime of Genocide in
Yugoslavia is Open to Any Nation Choosing to Assert It
The situation in the former Yugoslavia has renewed an outcry for the
creation of a world criminal court to administer claims of genocide and war
crimes violations," 5 but the delay in implementing such an organ could
create too great an obstacle to realization of an international criminal court
in time to adjudicate charges of genocide in the former Yugoslavia." 6
Article VI also provides for jurisdiction in the state in which the alleged
violations occured. In addition, alternative jurisdictional means exist outside
the convention in the form of nationality and universal jurisdiction.
Because most of the alleged atrocities have occurred in Bosnia-
15 U.N. Creates Panel to Examine Atrocities in Yugoslavia, supra note 18; Niall
Ferguson, Why the butchers of Bosnia may not be brought to book in the face of torture
executions and 'ethnic cleansing', demands grow for the Serb leaders to be tried for war
crimes, THE DAiLY TELEGRAPH, Sept. 2, 1992 at 14; Doyle, supra note 16; E.C. official
worried by lack of progress at talks, Agence France Presse (Jan. 6, 1993).
"6 Canada has requested the creation of an international criminal court to judge alleged
crimes in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but diplomats admit that such a tribunal could take two years
to come into fruition, even if it gets support. Ferguson, supra note 18.
The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe gave the go-ahead to the creation
of a Court of Human Rights to adjudicate crimes in the former Yugoslavia in November of
1992. EC: Committee of Ministers Favor Setting Up Court For Human Rights in Bosnia,
REUTER TEXTLUNE, Nov. 7, 1992. But see Starkman, supra note 62, at 33 (noting that even
where "parties to the European Convention agree to abide by all judicial decisions, as a matter
of sovereignty, states retain the power to ignore the decisions of the Court and the Committee
of Ministers").
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Herzegovina, that country may provide the preferred jurisdiction under article
VI. Regrettably, there is no guarantee that Bosnia-Herzegovina will still
exist as an independent nation at the time of adjudication. For this reason,
a limited interpretation of Article VI, confining jurisdiction to an internation-
al tribunal that does not exist or in the state where the offense occurred,
would not be effective to protect the victims of an aggressor nation intent on
committing genocide.
An alternative jurisdictional option is nationality jurisdiction. Under
nationality jurisdiction, the rump Yugoslav republic of Serbia-
Montenegro,11 7 as well as Bosnia and Croatia, could try its own nationals
for alleged crimes in Bosnia-Herzegovina before either an international
tribunal could be created or another state could assert jurisdiction." 8 Such
a proposition may already have been contemplated by the current Yugoslav
government which on December 16, 1992 submitted a bill to parliament
calling for a state committee to examine allegations of human rights
violations. 1 9 However, the obvious concern of objectivity inherent in
nationality jurisdiction limits the desirability of this choice.' 2
The best alternative is universal jurisdiction by a neutral state, assuming
117 CONST. OF THE FED. REP. OF YuGo. The Constitution was adopted on April 13, 1992
with the consent of the National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia and the Assembly of the
Republic of Montenegro. The document certifies that Yugoslavia has an uninterrupted
existence as an international entity composed of a voluntary association of Serbia and
Montenegro. Furthermore, Article II states that other republics may join the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia as member republics, in keeping with this Constitution.
"1 Yugoslav Deputy Federal Minister for Human Rights and Minorities Konstantin
Obradovic is quoted as saying that preconditions exist in Yugoslavia for bringing to justice
Geneva Convention violators at the national level with appropriate international monitoring.
Reaction to U.N. Resolution On War Crimes, Brit. Broadcasting Corp. (Oct. 15, 1992).
119 The committee would submit findings to competent judicial bodies. If it should be
unable to establish co-operation with judicial bodies outside the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia, the committee may ask for U.N. arbitration. Yugoslav Government Asks
Parliament to Approve War Crimes Investigation, Brit. Broadcasting Corp. (Dec. 18, 1992).
120 In the case of Croat soldiers captured by Serb forces and tried in Serbia for alleged
war crimes against civilians, Amnesty International reported that the soldiers were tortured
into confession. Marc Weller, Soldiers Charged By a State in Limbo, TIMEs NEWSPAPERS
LIMrrED, July 21, 1992. Though this situation is distinct from the scenario of a Serbian trial
for alleged war crimes committed by Serbs, it is some evidence of a lack of objectivity in
Serbian judicial proceedings.
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that one exists and is willing.' Under universal jurisdiction, a third party
country could assert jurisdiction regardless of the situs of the crime, victim,
or offender, due to the nature of the offenses." Such a scenario could
eliminate problems of partiality inherent in nationality jurisdiction, as well
as the problem of delay due to the lack of an international criminal court.
However, even assuming such universal jurisdiction is established, gaining
personal jurisdiction will remain a procedural hurdle.
2. An Extraordinary Effort on Behalf of the International Community will
be Required to Gain Personal Jurisdiction Over Many of the Potential
Defendants
If charged with failing to ensure their forces comply with the Convention,
or actually promoting "ethnic cleansing," Article IV would allow jurisdiction
over such political leaders as Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic, Bosnian
Serb leader Radovan Karadzic, and Bosnian Serb military commander Ratco
Mladic.'" Jurisdiction would also be appropriate for other private individ-
uals alleged to have committed acts of genocide whether they be Serb, Croat
or Muslim." However, achieving personal jurisdiction over the alleged
perpetrators in Yugoslavia may prove more difficult. 25 Although article.
121 During his U.S. Senate confirmation hearings, Secretary of State Warren Christopher
said the Clinton Administration would support a specially created war crimes tribunal with
jurisdiction in the United States for atrocities committed in the Balkans. Elaine Sciolino, U.S.
Moves Ahead on War-Crimes Tribunal, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 27, 1993, at A3.
122 Starkman, supra note 62, at 49.
123 Lawrence Eagleburger, the US Secretary of State under the Bush administration,
named Milosevic, Karadzic and Mladic as potential criminals as well as two Serb paramilitary
leaders, Vojislav Seselj and Zeljko Raznjatovic. Annika Savill and Tony Barber, West
Intensifies the Pressure Over Bosnia, THE INDEPENDENT, Dec. 17, 1992, at 1. Eagleburger
calls for those responsible for war crimes in Yugoslavia, including Milosevic, be brought to
trial, comparing the "ethnic horror" in Yugoslavia to Nazi genocide. Norman Kempster,
Eagleburger Seeks Balkan Atrocity Trials, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 17, 1992, at Al.
1' Other persons named as possible criminals include a Bosnian Serb who has confessed
to the killing of more than two hundred civilians, members of a Croatian paramilitary unit that
attacked a convoy of buses killing over fifty Serbian women and children, a leader of a
Serbian paramilitary force that has been linked to the practice of expelling non-Serbs from
Serb controlled areas in Bosnia, the mass murder of three thousand civilians, a commander
of a detention camp where mass execution and torture has occurred, and the camp commander
of another camp where fifteen Serbs were beaten to death. Kempster, id.
'25 See infra part IV.B.2. for a discussion of personal jurisdiction.
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VII of the Convention provides that genocide "shall not be considered as
political crimes for the purpose of extradition,"' 26 the Convention does not
otherwise facilitate the extradition of alleged violators.
It is unclear as to whether the rump Serbia-Montenegro Yugoslavia would
adhere to any existing extradition treaties promulgated in accord with the
Genocide Convention. Article XVI of the new Yugoslav Constitution
proclaims that the "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia will fulfill in good
measure the obligations that arise from international treaties of which it is a
party."' 2"  However, Article XVII of the Constitution declares that a
"Yugoslav citizen may not be deprived of citizenship, deported from the
country, nor extradited to another state."'2 Thus, if Article XVII is read
to trump Article XVI, it is doubtful that Serbia-Montenegro will be willing
to extradite its own nationals accused of genocide, and an alternative method
for obtaining personal jurisdiction will be necessary.
One alternative for gaining custody of Serbian culprits is a decisive
Bosnian victory combined with unconditional surrender on the part of the
alleged offenders. However, unless the early indications suggesting an
unwillingness on the part of the international community to go beyond
monitoring the situation'" are incorrect, such a result seems unlikely."
Unquestionably, an extraordinary effort on behalf of the international
community will be required to compell personal jurisdiction if some of the
alleged perpetrators remain in power.
126 Genocide Convention, art. VII.
127 1992 YuGo. CoNsT. art. 16.
,2 1992 YuGo. CONST. art. 17.
'9 E.C. officials suggest the following reasons for continued unwillingness to get tough
over Yugoslavia: fear of being dragged into the fighting, a growing suspicion that Moslems
as well as Serbs are guilty of provocation, and evidence that existing U.N. trade sanctions are
bringing the Serbian economy to its knees. Brocket Hall, E.G. Takes "Softly Softly" Approach
in Yugoslavia, Agence France Presse (Sept. 13, 1992).
However, western foreign ministers are moving closer to endorsing a proposed United
Nations Security Council resolution that would permit the use of force to stop Serbian military
flights in Bosnia-Herzegovina, though no country as of yet is prepared to commit ground
troops. Annika Savill and Tony Barber, supra note 132.
130 As of January 6, 1993 Serb forces occupied two thirds of Bosnian territory. Peace
Plan for Bosnia Gets Push, ATLAwA J. CONST., Jan. 6, 1993 at A3.
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3. Jurisdiction by the ICJ Over the Baltic States Will Not Adequately
Develop the Law of Genocide
Given the difficulty of obtaining personal jurisdiction over the alleged
offenders of the Genocide Convention, political leaders may be willing to
settle for adjudication before the ICJ.'3' Achieving Article IX jurisdiction
of the ICJ over the Baltic states of the former Yugoslavia may, however, be
an overly optimistic goal as it is unlikely the warring factions there would
participate. Considering that a state accused of genocide would likely evade
this kind of public condemnation, it is doubtless that such a state would
refuse voluntary submission to the Court's jurisdiction, even if jurisdiction
is considered compulsory.'
If jurisdiction is considered compulsory, a ruling absent participation and
compliance by one party would have some value in the development of the
law of genocide. However, while the importance of clarifying the substan-
tive provisions of Article II is substantial, the practical implications of such
a ruling in regard to extracting compliance or punitive effect in the former
Yugoslavia may be nothing more than wishful thinking. It is doubtful that
a country willing to flaunt international law through the practice of genocide
would adhere to an adverse ruling of the ICJ.
Before the dispute is over, it is unlikely that Serbia, Croatia, or Bosnia
would voluntarily submit to the kind of scrutiny the ICJ would subject upon
them. Once the war is over, jurisdiction over the victors would be even less
likely.'33 Without jurisdiction, compliance, and participation by all parties
to the dispute, a ruling by the ICJ would have limited effect. Therefore,
while the ICJ may be a source of some substantive clarification in regard to
article II, such jurisdiction will probably fail to adequately develop the law
of genocide.
13' As an alternative to the specially created tribunal in the United States, Secretary of
State Warren Christopher also suggested that the Clinton administration would support war
crimes trials before the ICJ for the alleged atrocities committed in the Balkans. Sciolino,
supra note 21, at A3.
132 Starkman, supra note 62, at 27.
113 In addition, war crimes trials would be unlikely until the war is over. "If you win, you
can try the other side's leaders; if you lose, you can try your own scapegoats." Ferguson,
supra, note 115, at 14.
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V. CONCLUSION
The vague notions of intent and group identity described in Article II of
the Genocide Convention are in need of the kind of scrutiny and clarification
that often are the product of an adversarial proceeding. Clearly, the situation
in the former Yugoslavia could provide the substance with which to decide
these issues to its jurisdiction.
However, absent the assertive intervention and co-operation on the part of
the international community unparalleled since Nuremburg, effective judicial
proceedings against alleged genocide in Bosnia-Herzegovina faces formidable
procedural obstacles. In the absence of an international criminal court,
subject matter jurisdiction may be limited to local tribunals. Even assuming
a competent tribunal is formed or found, it is unlikely high ranking Serbian
officials would submit.
It is imperative that the international community come together in some
form, either in the formation of a permanent or ad-hoc international tribunal,
or some other fashion to establish a competent organ to adjudicate issues
under the Genocide Convention. It has been asserted that the Genocide
Convention was inspired by the Nazi holocaust. The question in regard to
its application in Bosnia-Herzegovina must be, 'how much more inspiration
do we need?'
John Webb
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